May 2021, Special coverage of events in Ceuta | Press Review Morocco

The informality of borders

It is 4 a.m. 6 a.m. Spanish time. It is still dark. But at Bab Sebta (called El Tarajal by the Spanish), the border point between Fnideq and Sebta, the activity has already started. Hundreds of women, wrapped in scarves, a few young men, and also blind and elderly people, are gathered at the gate that formalizes the border. Under the gaze of the Moroccan police, they organise themselves calmly and form a disciplined line in front of a small gate, located to the right of the one usually used by cars and pedestrians. This gate is dedicated to the passage of these “hamalas” (porters), also called “portadoras” (porters), or mujeres mulas (mule women). Loaded with loads weighing up to 80 kilos, they are employed to carry goods from Sebta to the Moroccan side of the border every day, which are then sold in the souks in the north of Morocco and throughout the country (Derb Ghallef, etc.). In order to reduce the congestion and the mass of products, the customs have limited the entries: it is only possible to cross the border from Monday to Thursday, from 5 or 6 in the morning until around midday. The carriers, from the province of Tetouan, are therefore exempt from visa requirements. But a real traffic of domiciliation certificates allows people from all over Morocco to be domiciled in the communes of the province of Tetouan for 7000 to 8000 dhs. The same phenomenon exists in Melilla.

Informal trade?

Every morning, it is the same ritual. The gate opens at around 5am (Moroccan time). The long queue then starts to move towards a small “office”, located to the right of the police control offices through which these travellers pass. Exempted from visa formalities and from the obligation to have their passports stamped (which would quickly be saturated if they actually did the formalities at each passage), they go directly to the police officer in charge of passport control. He obviously knows them and lets them pass after having greeted them and accepted a 5 or 10 dhs coin (per pass) from them. This is a small amount of money if one considers that every day between 30,000 and 40,000 people (according to the police) use this passage, often several times a day. After the police check, each person rushes, in single file, into a long and narrow column surrounded by fencing and barbed wire that leads to the Spanish side, also separated from the one used by the usual pedestrians. It is a dangerous passage, especially in the suffocating heat, and in view of the number of people who sometimes pile up there. Incidents are regularly reported. At the end of May, two women died, suffocated in a stampede. Last August, another woman died as a result of blows to the head. At the exit of this long tunnel, Spanish police and customs officers vaguely check passports, obviously also used to the exercise.

Once past the police, another passage, also surrounded by fences and barbed wire, gives access to the “market”. The “Market” is in fact a gigantic free zone where 260 huge warehouses filled to the brim with various goods are grouped together: household appliances, textiles, food and cosmetics, etc. This merchandise, unloaded from ships arriving at the port of Sebta, is Spanish, but also Chinese or many other countries. The city’s status as a free zone, like that of Melilla, allows it to develop a trade in tax-free products. Goods that are then sold at a higher price on the markets of northern Morocco. Before the existence of this zone – opened in 2004 – these smugglers used to go to the city centre of Sebta for supplies. In order to relieve the city of this daily flow of 30-40,000 people (out of a total population of about 75,000), the Sebta authorities decided to build this market, especially for this clientele. The large traders present in Sebta are the suppliers of the owners of the Market’s warehouses (of Spanish and Moroccan nationality, but also – for some years now – Chinese, Indian and Syrian). The Market, built right on the border, therefore solves the problem of this mass of people transiting the city every day and saves time for the smugglers themselves.

Occupation? “Men and women mules”

Once at the market, it’s a rush. Not a minute is to be lost: for each journey made between Ceuta and Morocco, the carriers pocket thirty to one hundred dirhams (the price varies according to the content of the parcel). In front of each warehouse, the parcels are already ready for loading. The porters load the huge bundles on their backs, using ropes, tape or any other means possible, even filling their clothes with various goods. In these giant parcels, whose contents are not identifiable, we find all sorts of products: clothes, children’s nappies, cosmetics, household appliances or electronics (mobile phones, etc.) but also bottles of alcohol, etc. Thousands of women and men, like Si Aziz who is over 70 years old, carry every day on their backs loads of contraband goods of all kinds to feed the trade between the Spanish enclave of Sebta and Morocco.

Women are more likely to be smuggled than men, who are more often suspected of smuggling weapons or drugs. Mother of 3 children, Iman makes the round trip 5 to 6 times a day. “I have no other income to feed my three children”, she explains. The same goes for Fatima, 45 years old, divorced and taking care of her parents and her younger sister: “It allows the family to live. We have no choice, there is no work here”, she says before crossing the border. Lalla Aïcha, aged 75, only passes on a few products that she will then sell on her own account on the pavement in front of the Fnideq market. The most resilient of the porters manage to make five or six crossings per morning. The border closes at 1pm, putting an end to the porters’ comings and goings. The closing, like the opening, also depends on the goodwill of the Moroccan customs officers, who also filter the exits according to the bakchichs.

Once the goods have been “loaded”, their backs bent under their weight, the “mule men and women” set about climbing the hill towards the Biutz gate, “a semi-official border post between the Spanish enclave of Ceuta and Morocco”, explain associative sources, a crossing point of dubious legality. It was built a few hundred metres from the official customs post, and only carriers loaded with goods could use it. An interminable line then follows up the hill on the Moroccan side.

Everyone knows each other and greets each other. The policemen and customs officers too, some of whom even call each other by their first names.

The Moroccan police observe and make sure that order is maintained. The Spanish national police are indifferent, content to surround the crowd and ensure that the men’s and women’s turnstiles do not get blocked. Attention should be drawn to the absence of a commercial customs office at the Sebta border point on the Moroccan side, which means that it is simply impossible to legally bring in products from the Spanish side. Little or no control is carried out on the nature of the packages. However, recent accidents have made it necessary to introduce some standards into this chaotic trading system, which is far from European working standards. The Spanish police officers present are mainly concerned with the safety of the carriers and now control certain rules: it is forbidden to have packages that are too big, to always have one hand free in case of a fall, and to stay in the safety corridor.

The barons of the informal sector

Meanwhile, on the Moroccan side of the border, white taxis and private vehicles pass by, pouring in dozens more people who have also come to “cross”. They then park in the car park next to the Moroccan customs to wait for passengers to return. Others take a path, located to the left of the border crossing point and leading to a small hill. This hill is also reached by the path taken by the porters as they leave the Market. Once on the Moroccan side, the goods of all kinds are piled up on top of this hill, on a crowded median.

Some small piles obviously belong to individuals and are watched over by an elderly person or a child. Others, much larger, are watched over by “guards” as the porters leave and return. These belong to one big trader or smuggler. For if for a long time smuggling concerned “small smugglers” and was done in an “artisanal” way, it is evolving towards a different organisation and is gradually “industrializing”. Today, the majority of smugglers work for large “principals” and we are witnessing a shift from “small” to “large” trade, which is crowding out the “small” ones. “The so-called survival traffic – individual – has become a very small minority. The big traffic is the rule”, explains Lahbib Hajji, president of the Association for the Defence of Human Rights (ADDH) based in Tetouan, and very active in the region.

The goods are then loaded onto vehicles and transported at high speed. The goods are then loaded onto vehicles and transported at high speed to a covered car park, the Hammadi car park, where they are deposited for the Fnideq market (Souk El Massira). Other vehicles leave directly for Bab Nouader in Tetouan. According to security sources, the vehicles used, apart from the white collective taxis requisitioned for the mission, are stolen cars with false number plates. The rest is either stored or distributed in trucks that will supply the Derb Ghallef souks in Casablanca and the entire Moroccan market.

This “traffic”, which today provides a living for thousands of people, has gradually come under the control of about twenty large traders and traffickers who monopolise the market, employing hundreds of “smugglers” and intermediaries on their behalf, and “bribing” members of the Moroccan and Spanish police. “They pay the Spanish and Moroccan police and are helped by a very organised network of people,” said a source who requested anonymity. “They collect extraordinary amounts of money every day, have taken over the small smugglers and are in cahoots with the Moroccan and Spanish police and customs,” he continues.

Many, like him, or like the ADDH, denounce the involvement of security officials (police and customs) with the traffickers. This is particularly true of a perfectly observable process: the bales belonging to the traffickers are identified by a clearly visible number on the fabric surrounding the goods. The police and customs officers let them pass without any control. At the end of the day, the “big smugglers” pay their “bill”, i.e. the price of the total number of bales passed with the number that corresponds to them during the day. “There are 20 or 30 big traffickers who have divided this market by sector,” explains Mohamed Saïd Soussi, secretary general of the ADDH. Who are these fortunes? Where do they come from, and where do the masses of money they are making come from? “A few very rich people monopolise and control the smuggling traffic from Sebta and enslave thousands of porters for a few dirhams”, denounced Khalid Attaoui in an article published at the end of July 2008 1. In recent weeks, a real drop in “activity” between Sebta and Fnideq has been observed, some even speaking of a “smuggling crisis”.

The fact remains that “the region has become a real area of organised smuggling and these people impose their authority on all the small traders in the region. Especially since these are the same people who launch some of the big projects: cafés, tourist and real estate projects,” he adds. It is therefore difficult for others to initiate commercial projects in the face of them and the competition from contraband products. This is illustrated by the example of a shopkeeper in the Fnideq souk who explains, under cover of anonymity because he fears reprisals, that he was beaten up a few weeks ago by “henchmen” after having denounced this traffic in the press. To supply his business with second-hand clothes, he had two porters working. “But now I have to go through the traffickers. They are the ones who bring the goods to me with their porters.

Informal sectors but for whom?

This traffic is more or less legal, but the Spanish authorities turn a blind eye. The traders of the Sebta Market pay taxes to the Spanish authorities, who therefore see no problem with its existence and refuse to talk about smuggling. “The city’s authorities have a vested interest in selling their products and no interest in looking at their destination. Sebta’s economy depends on it,” says Mohamed Ali, president of the Muslim Association of Sebta and former shopkeeper in the city. According to him, this trade represents around 90% of Ceuta’s GDP. The value of exports between Sebta and Melilla and Morocco, mostly smuggled, reached 1 billion dollars (figures from the Economic Bulletin of the Chamber of Commerce of Sebta and Melilla) in 2000 and 1.4 billion dollars in 2003.

This is a significant financial windfall for this territory of about 15 km2 , which has no industry or other economic activities. All the more so as the economic situation of Sebta has deteriorated and is suffering from competition from Chinese products. “For some years now, there have been a lot of Chinese products on the market in Sebta. Many large traders now buy their supplies from China,” explains Mohamed Ali. This trade is also favoured by the absence of trade customs with Morocco. “There is no law governing trade between Sebta and Morocco,” Mohamed Ali denounces. Morocco refuses, for political reasons, to officialise a commercial exchange with Sebta, which would mean recognising its status as a Spanish city.

This traffic, a very worrying phenomenon for the region and its economic future, represents billions of losses for Morocco every year.

A region whose GDP is 10 to 15 times lower than that of Spain and Sebta (figures from the Ceuta Institute of Studies), a European border city and a pole of economic attraction, with a standard of living that contrasts with that of the northern region of Morocco in which it is located. All these elements are due to the extent of the traffic of goods between the Spanish enclave and Morocco. This traffic certainly provides a living for thousands of people in a region where other alternatives are rare. “There is no economic project offering work to the people here,” says Lahbib Hajji indignantly. So, for fear of the social consequences, they let it happen. “Morocco has no strategy against the informal sector and smuggling,” deplores El Houssine Majdoubi, a journalist from Tetouan who specialises in the North and lives in Madrid and has worked extensively on the subject. He adds that “the whole region lives on trafficking and smuggling, not to mention all those who are paid, at all levels, to let it happen”.

He estimates that this corruption amounts to at least 60 million euros per year for the city of Sebta alone. He underlines the economic, social and health consequences of this smuggling. Not to mention the fact that no controls are carried out on the quality of the goods. “Some of the goods transiting in this way are out of date,” Mohamed Ali denounced. “There are stocks, shops at the border that sell these expired products. Some of them are even relabelled with new expiry dates,” he explains. Some Chinese products, including pharmaceutical products that are starting to appear on the market (Viagra, for example!), are also sold in Morocco without any controls.

Although some say that the smuggling economy is in crisis, it still seems to have a bright future ahead of it. (this article has been published before 2020 as the borders closed before the COVID-19 pandemic- more information in the following articles)

For more information, please consult in (French) the following link.

Abuse, theft and harassment: the burden of “women mules” in Morocco

The “mule women” have certainly been relieved of their burden, but they have no alternatives. The closure of the border post for porters between Morocco and the Spanish enclave of Ceuta is causing an “unprecedented” socio-economic crisis, according to testimonies gathered by AFP.

“They want to turn us into beggars! “Fatima complains. The 50-year-old has worked all her life as a “mule woman” between the Moroccan town of Fnideq and Ceuta. Four months ago, the border post reserved for porters was suddenly closed, on Morocco’s decision, to fight against smuggling that affects its productive fabric. Like thousands of porters harnessed like beasts of burden, Fatima crossed the border of this free zone every day, her back weary from the duty-free Spanish goods she delivered to the town’s traders. “Before, business was good,” but now “there is no work here anymore,” complains this Moroccan woman who has raised five children on her own thanks to this long-tolerated smuggling.Read also Ill-treatment, theft and harassment: the burden of “mule women” in Morocco

It is difficult to regret the disappearance of a tiring and risky activity: in 2017, at least four carriers died in jostling, leading the following year authorities and traders of Ceuta to launch an initiative for the use of carts. But the delivery of the bundles (clothes, food and household goods) generated a commercial activity that irrigated the whole region. And both carriers and traders say they are now waiting for a solution for their reconversion. In the meantime, Fatima sells trinkets in a souk in Fnideq. I don’t earn anything anymore,” she murmurs.

“There are no more customers”

The Moroccan authorities, very prolix on the necessary regulation of the informal sector, have communicated little on the reasons for the closure. Nabyl Lakhdar, the director general of customs, told the daily L’Economiste that smuggled goods were “hurting the economy by destroying the productive sector” in Morocco.

Yet, without this smuggling, the economy of Fnideq, like that of Ceuta, is slowing down. “The impact is enormous,” says Abdellah Haudour, who sells Spanish blankets on the Moroccan side. “Prices have gone up, purchasing power has gone down. There are no more customers,” he says, showing his empty till. “Many have left the city,” he says. The usually crowded bus station is deserted. “My income has been divided by three,” says Mimoun El Mourabit, a 67-year-old taxi driver who used to make frequent trips to neighbouring towns.

Mr. Lakhdar recalls that the porters were “the first victims” of smuggling, with “certain mafiosi” taking advantage of “their precariousness and sometimes their distress”. Until then, everyday consumer products made in Morocco had also had difficulty finding their way into the markets of the north of the country, where Spanish smuggled products were king. This smuggling between Ceuta and Fnideq represented between 6 and 8 billion dirhams (between 570 and 750 million euros) annually, according to the estimates of the head of customs to the news website Médias24.

“Shops have closed”

At the beginning of January, a parliamentary report recommended creating an industrial zone in the region to enable the conversion of carriers. But “who is going to employ women mules in their fifties and illiterate? “asks Abdellah, the trader.

The products transported on foot via the Tarajal II border post were not taxed, hence the enormous weight of the loads carried on the backs of the porters – up to several dozen kilos. From now on, a gate closes the passage, under the eye of the gendarmes. The closure has also caused a “serious trade crisis” in the Spanish port city, as the Confederation of Ceuta’s entrepreneurs denounced in mid-December. At the entrance to the enclave, corrugated iron sheds house all kinds of goods sent by ship from the European continent. This is where most of the trade took place.

“Shops have closed, business has stopped. We are wasting our time here,” says Rachid, 48, in his shoe shop. “If this continues, I’ll have to close the curtain. We depend on the Spanish authorities, we are protected by the social security system. What about Moroccans? “he wonders. Jamal, his grocery neighbour, talks about “an unprecedented crisis” during which his turnover collapsed. Showing his unsold goods, he laments: “Our products are going out of date. “

For more information, please consult (in French) the following link.

M’diq-Fnideq: From smuggling to the formal economy, a strategic challenge [Interview]

After several months of economic crisis and several weeks of social protest, the inhabitants of M’diq-Fnideq are benefiting from the first initiatives to revitalise local activities. President of the Northern Observatory for Human Rights (ONDH), Mohamed Benaïssa analyses the situation since the closure of the economic borders with Ceuta.

What is the current social and economic situation in M’diq-Fnideq?

There are great disparities at the local level between municipalities that are part of the same prefecture, namely Martil, M’diq and Fnideq. This is due to the impact of the new coronavirus pandemic and the continued closure of the borders with Ceuta, but also to the drastic decrease in tourist activities, which used to be a central element of the economy in our region. The summer season, which did not take place, has accentuated this crisis, while a possible recovery was hoped for. The city most affected by this multi-factor crisis was Fnideq. This is why its population has demonstrated several times in recent weeks.

Before the closure of the borders for health reasons, smuggling activities via Ceuta were stopped. What are the retraining options for these families?

Since the closure of the economic borders in October 2019, we have already seen a change with the movement of several families living here, who have started to resettle in their original towns and villages. Those who have stayed have been able to rely on a local dynamic of solidarity and mutual aid, while waiting to find a new viable activity.

With this decision, many of those living from smuggling thought that it was a temporary measure and that the informal trade would resume sooner or later. They saw it more as an escalation of the political conflict between Morocco and Spain over the status of the two enclaves.

After several months, they eventually realised that the Moroccan authorities were determined to put an end to this activity once and for all, so many of them remained in a state of limbo before starting to think about a new source of income.

In the voluntary sector, organisations tended to welcome Morocco’s closure of economic borders as an end to decades of exploitation of vulnerable people in illegal activities. Do they have the same opinion today?

Within the ONDH, we are indeed among the human rights associations that supported the October 2019 decision, as we were the only organisation at the local level that called for an end to this activity, but with support through investment in economic alternatives. Our advocacy has been built on the basis of evidence and field data collected over several years, which converge primarily on the violations of the dignity and basic rights of those exploited in smuggling.

For more information, please consult (in French) the following link.

After relatively calm days, Fnideq resumes protest

Fnideq is once again protesting. On Wednesday 21 April, dozens of demonstrators marched towards the pashalik headquarters, chanting “the people want to earn their living”. They demanded, once again, the reopening of the borders with Ceuta to resume informal trade. In the absence of a solution from the authorities, the protest could resume on Friday 23 April.

Since the first anger of the inhabitants of Fnideq on 5 February, the wilaya of the Tangier-Tetouan-Al Hoceima region has launched programmes for hundreds of people who lost their main source of income with the closure of the border with Ceuta, and distributed food aid to the needy.

Nevertheless, the problem concerns thousands of citizens. In addition to the traders, there are the legal workers who used to enter Ceuta on a daily basis who are suffering from the loss of their jobs. The situation in Fnideq is identical to those in Nador and Beni Nsar. There too, the closure of the border with Melilla has left thousands of men and women stranded.

For more information, please consult (in French) the following link.

Fnideq: Economic crisis pushes young people to collectively risk their lives at sea

It was a weekend like no other for the inhabitants of Fnideq and M’diq, towns plagued by an unprecedented social crisis that continues to worsen as long as the borders with Sebta remain closed. After protesting repeatedly, sometimes violently, against marginalisation and the lack of alternative opportunities for cross-border trade, young people seem to have no choice but to leave their town, in a way that risks being suicidal.

A collective migration – More than 70 people have emboldened themselves to swim to the enclave of Sebta, local Moroccan and Spanish media reported. In an unprecedented scene that continues to make the rounds on social networks, young migrants were even encouraged by some locals as they prepared to throw themselves into the sea. While most of them managed to reach the coast of Trajal, thanks to the help of rescue teams and the Red Cross, some (the number is still unknown) perished during their crossing and others are still missing. El Faro de Ceuta reported two cases of missing minors and one case of death of a man, father of a family.

Loss of hope? – If young people are risking their lives so desperately, it is because life in Fnideq, as in M’diq and Martil, is becoming very difficult, if not unbearable. For the past three months, the town has been living to the rhythm of the demonstrations of the inhabitants, who have been hit hard by the closure of the border with Sebta, which was the only source of income for hundreds of families, living from cross-border trade and smuggling. Contacted by L’Opinion, Mohammed Abgar, a lawyer and member of the think tank for Fnideq, said that many are losing their jobs in the city under the dual effect of the suspension of smuggling, and the restrictive measures due to the state of health emergency. “This is a structural social crisis,” Abgar said, adding that many young people no longer have hope for an improvement in their lot, despite the promises of the region’s authorities, who have announced job-creating projects in response to the social discontent. For his part, Abderrahman Mandor, a local community activist, believes that this collective migration of young people shows the seriousness of the economic situation in the city of Fnideq. The curfew, the confinement and the closure of the borders have drastically reduced the income of the families, the majority of whom live from daily and informal activities”, he explained, adding that the economy of Fnideq cruelly depends on that of Sebta.

The difficult return to normal life: Despite the plan prepared by the government to reinvigorate economic activity in the city, this is not enough to reassure the inhabitants, especially the young, who expect immediate jobs and instant solutions. In this critical context, patch-up measures are useless in the eyes of Abderrahman Mandor, who believes that only massive government intervention can remedy the current slump.

For more information, please consult (in French) the following link.

For more information on Morocco’s migration to Europe in the last 50 years, a comparison with the countries in the region and the development of a culture of emigration since the 1990s, please consult (in English) the following link.

Ceuta and Melilla: the story of the last two “Spanish” enclaves in North Africa

What is the history of the cities of Ceuta and Melilla?

The story of the fall of the two cities begins with the weakening of the Emirate of Beni Al-Ahmar in Granada in the 15th century AD, so that the Portuguese occupied Ceuta in 1415, then Melilla fell into Spanish hands in 1497, and Ceuta remained under Portuguese occupation until 1580 when Spain annexed the Kingdom of Portugal.

Ceuta

Ceuta is located on the Moroccan coast at the entrance to the Mediterranean at the Strait of Gibraltar, and has an area of 20 square kilometres, and is currently home to 77 thousand people. Due to its strategic location, it was controlled by the Romans in 42 AD, and about 400 years later, the Vandals expelled the Romans from the city. Later it was dominated by the Byzantines and then the Goths from Spain.

Ceuta was the base for the Islamic invasion led by Tariq ibn Ziyad of Spain, when his Gothic leader, Julian, changed his position and urged the Muslims to invade Spain. After the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate, chaos reigned until the Murids took control, and they also took it as a base for the attack on Andalusia in 1084.

The change of sovereignty over the city continued until the Portuguese occupied it in 1415, led by Prince Henry the Sea, who aimed to eliminate Muslim influence in the region, and then the city became Spanish when the Spanish king, Philip II, assumed the Portuguese throne in 1580. And after Spain recognised Portugal’s independence, through the Treaty of Lisbon in 1668, the latter ceded Ceuta to Spain. After Morocco gained independence from Spain and France in 1956, Spain retained Ceuta, which has been an autonomous region since 1995.

Melilla

Melilla is located in eastern Morocco, near the Algerian border, off the southern coast of Spain. It covers an area of over 12 square kilometres and currently has a population of 70,000. It was originally a castle built on a high hill, 500 kilometres from the Spanish coast, and is therefore more influenced by Moroccan culture, and the number of Moroccans living there is greater than those living in Ceuta.

The Spanish forces in Melilla were the first to rebel against the leftist government in Madrid, during the Spanish Civil War which broke out in 1936 and lasted until 1939. Melilla remained in the Spanish province of Malaga until 14 March 1995, when it became an autonomous region.

Muslims in both cities had revolted in 1985 to protest against the “Aliens Law”, which required all foreigners in Spain to register their names with the authorities or be deported.

The unemployment rate of Moroccans in both cities is over 30%, which is among the highest in Spain. The two cities also attract thousands of merchants and workers from Moroccan lands who cross the border from Morocco every day to earn a living in these two enclaves.

For more information, please consult (in French) the following link and for more information on the history of Melilla and Ceuta please consult the following link. For more information on the externalisation of European asylum and migration policies, please click here and here.

Brahim Ghali case: “El País” publishes new revelations on the Spanish stay of the Polisario leader

The treatment of the Polisario leader in a Spanish hospital, requested by Algiers, has been analysed at the highest level in Madrid, not without some reticence. According to ‘El País’, only a few bilateral meetings between Morocco and Spain have since been suspended.

The title chosen is unambiguous: “A favour to Algeria that poisons relations with Morocco”. In an article published on Tuesday 11 May, the Spanish daily El País recounts the behind-the-scenes story of the transfer of Polisario Front leader Brahim Ghali, who has been hospitalised since the end of April in the hospital of San Pedro de Logroño, near Zaragoza.

He would have landed on 18 April at the air base in Zaragoza, according to the Spanish daily, while Jeune Afrique, the source of the revelations, mentioned the date of 21 April. Brahim Ghali is said to have arrived in Spain on board a plane of the Algerian presidency.

Taken under police escort to the hospital, El País confirms that Brahim Ghali registered under the alias of an Algerian citizen – Mohamed Ben Battouche – “for security reasons”. He adds: “The Polisario leader, according to the sources consulted, entered Spain with his identity and his diplomatic passport.

Between reluctance and lack of time

According to El País, it was Sabri Boukadoum, the Algerian Minister of Foreign Affairs, who made the request to the Spanish authorities during his official visit to Madrid in early April. The head of Algerian diplomacy is said to have “implored” that Ghali be taken care of in Spain, as he is “seriously ill with Covid and in danger of death”, writes the Spanish daily.

“The delicate request has been analysed at the highest level and, despite the reluctance of the Minister of the Interior, Fernando Grande-Marlaska, it has been given the green light ‘for strictly humanitarian reasons’.

“The delicate request has been analysed at the highest level and, despite the reluctance of the interior minister, Fernando Grande-Marlaska, it has been given the green light ‘for strictly humanitarian reasons’,” El País continues, citing diplomatic sources. The daily also refers to the “strategic nature” of Spanish relations with Algeria, the leading supplier of gas to the Spanish market.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Arancha González Laya, had planned to communicate this to her Moroccan counterpart, Nasser Bourita, “but the affair broke out before she could”, writes El País, citing government sources.

Bilateral relations shaken

According to the daily, Madrid has also not digested the fact that Rabat did not warn it of the American recognition of sovereignty over the Sahara and of the Moroccan rapprochement with Israel, which took place on 10 December 2020. These announcements “surprised the Spanish Minister (of Foreign Affairs, editor’s note) on a visit to Israel” on 9 and 10 December.

For the time being, some bilateral meetings “of a technical nature” between Madrid and Rabat have been suspended, as a consequence of the cooling of relations. However, “nothing indicates that the most sensitive areas such as cooperation in the fight against illegal immigration or jihadism have suffered” from this episode.

As for Brahim Ghali, he is said to be recovering from the coronavirus and has been summoned to appear before the judge of the Audiencia Nacional, Spain’s highest court, to be heard. Confounded by the police, Brahim Ghali has been prosecuted in Spain since 2006 for the crime of genocide, murder and torture following a complaint lodged by three Sahrawis who lived in the Tindouf camps.

The man is also the subject of an international arrest warrant issued by the Spanish judiciary in November 2016, a few months after he became head of the Polisario.

For more information, please consult (in French) the following link.

Hospitalization of Brahim Ghali: Morocco “deplores” Spain’s attitude

In an unequivocal statement, Moroccan diplomacy denounced the attitude of Spain, which welcomed the Polisario leader, Brahim Ghali, for “humanitarian reasons”. The latter had gone to Spain for health reasons.

For Morocco, the authorisation granted by the Spanish authorities is an “act contrary to the spirit of partnership and good neighbourliness” that animates the relations between the two countries. For Moroccan diplomacy, Madrid’s decision raises “incomprehension” and “questions” which are listed in this statement:

• Why was the so-called Brahim Ghali admitted to Spain on the sly and with a false passport?
• Why did Spain consider it useful not to inform Morocco?
• Why did it opt for his admission under a false identity?
• Why has the Spanish justice system not yet reacted to the numerous complaints lodged by the victims?

Beyond the questions, the communiqué also reveals that the Spanish ambassador in Rabat has been summoned by Moroccan diplomacy to explain “the attitude of his government”.

The Polisario leader Brahim Ghali was admitted for treatment on 21 April in a hospital in Logroño, not far from Zaragoza, Spain. On 23 April, the head of Spanish diplomacy, Arancha González Laya, stated that Madrid’s decision to receive the separatist leader “does not prevent or disturb in any way” relations with Morocco, and will not change the “privileged treatment” with the neighbouring country.

For more information, please consult (in French) the following link.

Children in Border and Asylum Procedures: Push Backs of Migrant Children at the Border

The Spanish enclaves Melilla and Ceuta are located in the north of the African continent, and despite their location, are a part of the Kingdom of Spain. Both cities share the only direct land-based border of an EU country with Africa, more precisely with the country of Morocco in North Africa.

This Spanish-Moroccan border as a whole is protected by a barbed-wire fence structure on the Spanish territory. (European Centre for Constitutional and Human Rights, 2018). The construction and therefore the protection of the only African-EU land border from irregular migration started in 1990 and was improved in heights and technical surveillance over the years, costing Spain several hundred million euros (some of this amount being the funds from the EU) (Amnesty International, 2015).

Legal Situation

Domestic Legal Framework: Until the end of 2014, Spain lacked legal and accessible procedures to apply for asylum at the border and lacked a legal basis for the implemented push back procedure as it relied on protocols legitimising, but not legalising it.

On the 1 April 2015, the Amendment to the Spanish Organic Law Act 4/2015 was adopted by the addition of the Tenth additional provision on the Special Regime of Ceuta and Melilla which provides a legal basis for the “push-backs”. This Tenth additional provision allows the border officers to reject “foreign nationals who are detected on the border line of the territorial demarcation of Ceuta or Melilla while attempting to overcome the border containment elements in order to cross the border irregularly […] in order to prevent their illegal entry into Spain” (Organic Law Act 4/2015, Tenth additional provision).

Apart from a broad reference to the international human rights and international protection standards, the Special Regime of Ceuta and Melilla does not provide for any specific provisions implementing or requiring a differential treatment of children and acknowledging their unique vulnerability, even in the situation of irregular entry into the Spanish territory.

Spanish-Moroccan Readmission Agreements: In 1992, the Readmission Agreements between Morocco and Spain created a bilateral agreement for the cooperation for the readmission of migrants entering irregularly from Morocco into Spain. These Agreements determined Morocco as the gatekeeper of the external European border.

The readmission procedure, enshrined in Article 1 to 5 of the Agreements, provides that Spain can formally request Morocco to readmit migrants to its territory when these individuals are entering the territory irregularly. Moreover, the Readmission Agreement fails to implement provisions that acknowledge the vulnerability of children and create an obligation for states to implement appropriate measures to safeguard and protect these vulnerabilities.

Migrant Children at the Border

Access to Migrant Protection: Based on the lack of formal and established reception centres for asylum-seekers, many migrant children reside in informal camps and settlements in Morocco (Human Rights Watch, 2014). The majority of children in these camps are of Sub-Saharan origin as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) describes the access to the established legal and safe application procedures for international protection for those as effectively impossible (UNHCR, 2018). The Moroccan authorities control the access to the legal asylum offices at the border. The UNHCR published that during the period between 2014 and 2017 only 35 individuals of Sub-Saharan origin (compared to 11.150 individuals of Middle-Eastern and Northern African origin) applied for asylum (UNHCR, 2018).

This inaccessibility of the regular border procedures leads children of Sub-Saharan African origin to circumvent the existing procedures and to approach the border irregularly hoping to trigger the jurisdictional responsibility of Spain and consequently the obligation to assess their need of protection (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2020). If compared with the regular routes, the irregular routes are highly dangerous and go along with a high risk to the life and the well-being of these individuals (La Sexta, 2020).

Access to Child Protection: The Moroccan government does not differentiate between particularly vulnerable groups, in particular children, despite the ratification of the CRC (Human Rights Watch, 2014). The Moroccan authorities, represented by the Moroccan Auxiliary Forces (MAF), indiscriminately expose the children settled in the informal camps to violence regularly (Human Rights Watch, 2014).

According to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on torture, Nils Melzer, and the Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (OHCHR), this treatment of children who are residing in informal settlements close to the cities of Nador and Oujda amounts itself to ill-treatment and a violation of the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment (OHCHR, 2018). Additionally, the CRC Committee is concerned about the implementation of the procedural safeguards enshrined “the best interest of the child” principle, the access to health care, the deteriorating health conditions of children in Migrant Reception Centres and the arrest and detention of refugee and asylum-seeking children (Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2014).

Spain’s Push Backs (Hot Returns)

Definition: “Hot returns” or so-called “Push backs” describe expulsions on a de facto basis and without any procedural guarantees and protection of any person who enters a country irregularly. Notably, “the expulsions without any individual assessment of protection needs have become a documented phenomenon at Europe’s borders, as well as on the territory of Member States further inland. As these practices are widespread, and in some countries systematic, these “push backs” can be considered as part of national policies rather than incidental actions. The highest risk attached to push backs is the risk of refoulement.” (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 2019).

The individuals are indiscriminately detained, often violently, and through doors and gates in the fence structure pushed back into the Moroccan territory or handed over to Moroccan security forces who frequently use excessive violence (Human Rights Watch, 2014). These expulsions are carried out without any registration and assessment of the migrant´s identity and vulnerabilities as the Spanish authorities do not consider these individuals on their territory and in their jurisdiction (Human Rights Watch, 2014).

The Spanish authorities apply an operational interpretation of borders, which provides the possibility to move the demarcation of the border with the position line of the border officers. As a result of that interpretation, Spain requires individuals to physically cross the line of border officers to legally claim to be present on Spanish territory (Human Rights Watch, 2014).

This conception would allow the Spanish authorities to move the borderline on a case-by-case basis (Jesuit Migrant Service, n.d.) and denies any jurisdictional responsibility for migrants, who, by crossing the territorial border, are physically present on the Spanish territory and are under the effective control of the Spanish authorities (Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2019). This conception of jurisdiction is contrary to the universally accepted and binding concept of jurisdiction, which the ECtHR in its jurisprudence has defined as the exercise of effective control over a person or territory – de facto or de jure (Al-Skeini and others v UK, 2011).

For more information, please consult (in English) the following link.